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Abstract: In Afghanistan, police reform is an important focus of international efforts. After over a decade
of assistance, however, there are still daunting challenges of public trust and police effectiveness. From
a civilian perspective, the role of the police is a crucial one—and very different from that of the military.
Communities, being at the very heart of security challenges, are well positioned to understand the intricacies
of security and development. A police service able to work closely with communities plays an important role
in managing conflict in the long run. Recognizing this, Afghanistan’s Ministry of Interior Affairs (MoIA) has
steadily increased its efforts in community-oriented policing (COP), despite a deteriorating security situation
since the withdrawal of US troops in 2014.
This paper explores how COP in Afghanistan links with local communities and institutions to ensure both
peoples’ security and trust. It begins by considering police-community relations through a broad lens of
human security, which comprises the social, economic, political, cultural and legal aspects of their everyday
lives. We then examine international assistance to police reform, how the Afghan police have developed
their COP philosophy, and how this has played out in re-defining police-community relations. Using field data
from Nimruz Province, we then look at the role of local institutions of chowkidari and shura in addressing
people’s insecurities, and opportunities for linking these with COP efforts of the police. We conclude that
there is a real potential for COP in Afghanistan that his locally owned and sustainable, if enough attention
is given to inclusive processes and developing creative and flexible trust-building relationships with local
institutions and organizations.
Keywords: Afghanistan; community-based policing; international police assistance; local institutions; local
ownership; police reform; post-conflict; trust-building
1. Introduction
The need for more knowledge on the complex security
and humanitarian challenges in post-conflict societies is
critical. In post-conflict situations, there will clearly be a
need to protect and keep order as people reconstruct their
lives and livelihoods. The best way of doing this in such
diverse, volatile environments, however, cannot be deter-
mined at a state level alone, but also at the local level.
Those best positioned to understand the complexities of
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security, development and humanitarian assistance are the
communities who are in the midst of these conflicts and
whose lives are actually at stake. The effects of conflict
can be devastating, but also varied. This is the case in
Afghanistan, which after more than 18 years of international
assistance remains in the midst of many internal and exter-
nal conflicts, both old and new. Nevertheless, the Ministry
of Interior Affairs (MoIA) continues to expand its efforts to-
wards a civil approach to policing through the activities of
its community-oriented policing (COP) department Police-e
Mardumi (PEM). What processes have influenced this di-
rection, and what has constrained and enabled this move?
Is community-oriented policing merely a pre-defined and im-
ported concept introduced by the international community,
or does it represent an effort to build on local institutions,
customs and norms? What are these local institutions?
What efforts have been undertaken by both the police and
civil society to build trust and at the same time to address
the complexity of issues faced by communities experiencing
conflict and insecurity? This paper explores how COP in
Afghanistan links with local communities and institutions to
ensure both peoples’ security and their trust. To do so, it
analyzes the evolution of COP in Afghanistan, looking at
those activities which were implemented in line with inter-
national police reform processes, those pilot projects which
sprang from civil society initiatives and are grounded in lo-
cal institutions, customs and norms, and those initiatives
which evolved locally without international intervention, as
exemplified in our case of Nimruz. In this, we explore the
spaces between the government and civil society where
trust is negotiated, and innovative ways to address com-
plex issues are created. We argue that the active inclusion
of civil society in COP, and efforts to evolve trusting rela-
tionships between the police and local institutions such as
the chowkidari and shura, have led to flexibility, creativity
and sustainability of COP efforts in Afghanistan, despite a
worsening political situation.
1.1. Between Human Security and COP
1.1.1. Afghanistan and Security
In post-conflict situations, the transition from military to
civilian-based security is crucial. The police represent one
important institution working with security issues. An ac-
countable national police service that is capable of uphold-
ing the rule of law in the whole country is an important
prerequisite for any state-building effort [1]. A democratiza-
tion process would be a step to transform the police from
a repressive structure to an institution that can facilitate
trust between the public and ‘new-born’ government. As
Tadjbakhsh [2] clearly suggests, “Security is not just the
end of war, but also the ability to go about one’s business
safely, in a safe environment, to have a job, to participate
in political processes, to have choices for the education of
one’s children, to live a healthy life and to do all this with
the knowledge that one’s family is safe and not harmed” (p.
58). From a civilian perspective, the role of the police in
post-conflict societies is a crucial one. The main aim of the
state and the police is to provide security to all its citizens,
leading to less crime, more social order, physical and men-
tal safety, and an atmosphere of trust and confidence in
citizens that their life will be protected [3].
COP [4] is recognized as an important model of polic-
ing that can help to restore trust and cooperation between
police and communities. As a policing strategy, its strength
lies in its approach, which although varied across contexts,
often focuses on communication, responsiveness, account-
ability, prevention and trust-building with communities in
order to jointly find solutions to local security issues [5]. In
post-conflict police reform, interest in COP as an approach
has been steadily increasing, as governments and inter-
national donors see that ‘hard’ security approaches have
done little to build trust in these volatile societies. The UN,
for example, has made a radical shift in policy to promote
COP in post-conflict police reform [6]. How COP is cre-
ated and practiced locally, however, is complex and context
dependent, and can therefore differ widely between coun-
tries, regions and even villages in terms of the nature of
interaction between the police, civil society and community
members. While this diversity opens many pathways of en-
quiry on COP, this paper focuses on the process of reform,
and specifically on how police-community relations are cre-
ated and practiced in the case of Afghanistan through the
local institutions of chowkidari and shura.
In Afghanistan, insecurity includes both internal and ex-
ternal dimensions. Issues like poverty, social and economic
inequalities, scarcity of resources, ethnic and tribal rivalries,
domestic violence, illiteracy and lack of basic education, un-
employment and weak political and government institutions
are some of the major internal factors contributing to inse-
curity and conflict. This is also reiterated by Afghanistan
Human Development Report [7]:
Insecurity in Afghanistan is not only a problem of physi-
cal safety, but also of deprivation and restricted access to
health and educational facilities, legal and political rights,
and social opportunities. Dealing with insecurity should not
be sought (solely) thorough short-term military solutions,
but through a long-term comprehensive strategy that abides
by promises of development and the promotion of human
rights. (p.26)
External factors such foreign invasions, cross-border
terrorism, and insurgencies advocated by Taliban or ISIS
also contribute to insecurity and conflicts, interlinking with
internal dimensions. It is in this complex context that the
police interact with communities.
As a basis for our understanding of the complexities
involved in security and insecurity, the concept of human
security is useful. Human security, with its focus on the
security of people rather than only states [8] opens up a
broader range of security/insecurity issues as experienced
by different people in Afghanistan. The concept can thus
help in understanding how local women and men attempt
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to cope with different kinds of insecurities (both internal
and external), and which institutions (government and tra-
ditional) they interact with to address them. It therefore
offers a way to study police-community relations that allows
for the inclusion of all relevant actors and institutions that
together may contribute to or threaten human security of
women, men and children in the analysis. For the civilian
police, the concept of human security seems to lie closer to
their mandate of protecting individuals through upholding
law and order compared with the mandate of the military,
which concentrates on protecting the interests of the state,
mainly from foreign aggression. As the Afghanistan Hu-
man Development report of 2007 [9] clearly states, ‘the
ability of ANP to maintain law and order ... and strength-
ening the rule of law in Afghanistan is critical to creating
an enabling environment for progress in other key areas
of human development, including economic growth, social
development and political freedom’ (p.18). It is in this con-
text that human security is seen in relation to civil police. In
post-conflict societies, policing perspectives which attempt
to understand and deal with the complexity, experiences
and strategies of local communities might contribute to bet-
ter police-community relations, increased trust, sustainable
solutions to and prevention of local and national issues of
insecurity and ultimately lead to effective local ownership.
A perspective based in human security allows for such an
analysis.
1.1.2. Foreign and Local Efforts
Police reform in post-conflict contexts, however, is also com-
plex. Foreign actors, including donor countries coordinated
under multilateral organizations such as the EU and UN,
provide substantial support to police reform. The result is a
myriad of advice from the international community, which
may be substantively inconsistent. In such a setting, power
relations both between donor countries and between the
international community and national governments, steered
by funding and politics, can easily determine the character
of police reform efforts [10–16]. In post-conflict contexts,
military and state security perspectives can easily domi-
nate the discourse on international assistance [11]. These
perspectives spill over into civilian police reform processes,
militarizing the civilian police rather than promoting a police
service that builds trust with communities and addresses
their broader set of insecurities (which could include, but
not be limited to, the threat of insurgency).
There are also concerns of local ownership in reform
processes. As a concept, local ownership has become a
mantra of post-conflict reform and development and is of-
ten cited as a specific criterion of success in international
interventions [12]. However, while used in police reform
documents as if its meaning is understood or agreed upon,
its meaning is in fact ambiguous, particularly in terms of
the nature and degree of local participation in reform pro-
cesses. Bendix and Stanley [12] give examples of two very
different definitions of local ownership used in reform litera-
ture. The first one cites Boughton [12] to assert that ‘local
actors need not have been involved in the development of
reform programs, let alone be the initiators, in order to qual-
ify as ‘owners’. Rather, all that is needed is for the owner
to ‘appreciate the benefits of the policies and to accept re-
sponsibility for them’ [12]. At the other end of the spectrum
is OECD’s perspective, where advisors should support or
facilitate local actors rather than lead them, stressing ‘it is
important that solutions to problems are developed locally
and appropriate to the context they are implemented in.
Giving primary responsibility to the government and other
local stakeholders is essential to locally-owned SSR’ [12].
Merely identifying local owners of reform processes and
getting their buy-in (in the case of Afghanistan it could be
the police and/or shura) is not enough; one needs to under-
stand local context and how various actors are involved in
the process. Vogelaar unpacks the term further in her work
on SSR in Mali, where she builds on Bojicic-Dzelilovic’s
understanding of local ownership as a guiding philosophy
rather than a mere goal or target of intervention. Focus is
put on the relational and contextual nature of the concept,
and how it emerges from the shared experience of external
and internal actors [13]. Vogelaar suggests, in line with
Bendix and OECD, that in addition to local ownership in
terms of government buy-in, SSR should consider the level
of inclusivity in processes related to reform. Taking a ‘whole
of society’ approach [13], she points to the importance of
looking at how a variety of actors, from different power
bases from across society participate in decision-making
processes on the design and implementation of reform pro-
cesses. With our focus on human security and the ways
in which the police and civil society communicate and at-
tempt to build trusting relationships in COP, we contribute
to the emerging literature on local ownership as a ‘whole-of-
society’ approach where a variety of local actors participate
in the design, institutionalization and implementation of se-
curity reform. It also contributes to policy and literature on
the role of police advisors in SSR [14], bringing in power
relations in police reform processes not only at international
and national levels [10], but at local levels as well, where
police meet local women and men in their everyday lives.
With these lenses, we explore the experiences and potential
of community-oriented policing even in a politically insecure
context such as Afghanistan.
2. Methods
This paper is based on field data from Afghanistan col-
lected between November 2015 and April 2018. In Kabul,
staff of MoIA, civil society organizations (CSOs), and non-
governmental organizations (NGOs) were interviewed, as
well as international police and policing experts based in
Kabul and internationally (who had worked in Afghanistan).
The local researcher also attended police training sessions
in COP, and workshops organized by MoIA, EUPOL and
CSOs as a participant observer. We have also consulted
secondary data including research papers, reports and pol-
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icy documents. To study links between communities and the
police more closely, interviews and focus group discussions
were held in Nimruz province at both provincial and district
levels with MoIA staff, CSOs and local community women
and men, in urban and rural areas. Nimruz was chosen as
a case for several reasons. It has been one of the provinces
with the lowest level of international intervention—it never,
for example, had a Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT),
and there have been relatively few aid organizations oper-
ating in the region. This means that Nimruz has remained
under the international radar and under-researched, which
makes it possible to study police-community relations out-
side of the direct influence of the international community,
providing an interesting contrast to the project-based cases
of COP in other areas of Afghanistan that we examine. Also,
Nimruz province has one of the highest number of migrants
and internally displaced people in the country due to con-
flict and economic hardship, making it an interesting case
to examine what migration might mean in terms of social
relations and trust-building in communities. These aspects
make Nimruz a unique case in some ways, however, the
findings can nevertheless be relevant for understanding
police-community relations in other provinces in that they
provide new perspectives on how to understand the variety
of local institutions in post-conflict settings.
3. Post-Bonn Security Sector Reform Assistance in
Afghanistan
3.1. Building a Foundation
The international community has been assisting the Afghan
government in security sector reform since the Bonn Agree-
ment in 2001. The roadmap provided by the Bonn agree-
ment divided the responsibility of security reform amongst
five countries; Germany took responsibility for police reform,
Italy for judicial reform, the UK for counter narcotics, Japan
for disarmament, demobilization and the US for military
reform [15,16]. By 2009, the approach of Germany con-
centrating on quality, long-term education and training for
police (lasting from four months to four years) was under
criticism from the US, who insisted that it was critical to
have more ‘boots on the ground’ quickly [17]. In 2007, with
the cooperation of the newly-established EUPOL program,
the US military launched the Focused District Development
(FDD) training program, where district police were trained
by private security contractors for six to eight weeks in mili-
tary skills to fight armed insurgents. This represented a shift
in the main goal for the police to one of counter-insurgency
(COIN), a military approach with state security at the center.
On the one hand, many international police experts con-
firmed the need for a police force to deal with threats in the
form of insurgencies, terrorism and warlordism, either by
themselves, or with military assistance. At the same time,
however, other police experts and civil society actors argued
for a civilian law and order service to deal with day-to-day
insecurities faced by the people, which could potentially
have a preventive effect. Even as the FDD program was
being launched, other voices continued to push for a civil
police reform agenda “Good policing is vital for democracy,
and democratic functioning is vital for counter-insurgency;
the two are not and must not be seen as mutually exclu-
sive. If police reform in Afghanistan is to succeed, the
goal should be creation of a trusted, civilian service, which
enforces—and is accountable to—the rule of law” [18].
To assist MoIA in coordinating international efforts in
police reform, the International Police Coordinating Board
(IPCB) was established in 2006 comprising ambassadors
of member countries (donors), and international organiza-
tions involved in security sector reform [19]. Through their
quarterly meetings chaired by the Minister of Interior Affairs,
they took up different issues concerning police reform. The
IPCB also established the Senior Police Advisory Group
(SPAG), again led by MoIA, and comprising all international
police organizations in Afghanistan. SPAG’s role was to give
professional policing advice to IPCB on all police-related
issues and challenges facing the country, including human
rights, gender issues, training, and police-community re-
lations. Both the IPCB and SPAG were to contribute to
improving police professionalism in order to provide qual-
ity security services to citizens and strengthen the trust
between people and the police.
Despite the dominance of NATO and ISAF in initial meet-
ings [20], the establishment of IPCB and its focus on civilian
policing expertise through SPAG likely contributed to the
gradual shift away from military strategies in police reform.
From 2009, for example, a number of community-based
policing pilots were initiated by MoIA with the support of
IPCB members, and in 2013 international police reform
support shifted in effect from under the SSR umbrella to
UNDP/LOTFA’s Rule of Law program, again, emphasizing
a civil security approach. This shift is also evident in MoIA
itself. In 2015, the secretariat of the IPCB was shifted to
what is now MoIA’s General Directorate of International
Cooperation, where 58 civilians are responsible for ‘co-
ordinating diplomatic and foreign affairs, protocols, ANP
trainings abroad, seminars, conferences and workshops
around the world’ [21]. In addition, MoIA currently employs
more than 9,500 civilians, and as of late 2016 employed 269
young, college-educated, and technically-proficient Afghans
have been employed by MoIA as a part of a Subject Matter
Expert (SME) program [22].
3.1.1. The Afghan National Police
The ANP itself comprises uniformed police forces carrying
out general police duties, and specialized police forces re-
sponsible for border control, terrorism and counter narcotics
and public order [23]. As of 2018 the strength of ANP is
about 122,000, and there has also been some re-structuring
between MoIA and the Ministry of Defence (MoD). As part
of a move to transfer the more militarized units of the ANP
to MoD, around 20, 000 personnel have been moved from
the ANP to MoD, allowing MoIA to keep control of personnel
57
carrying out general police duties. The number of female
police officers is around 3444 comprising two per cent of
the police force. According to an Asia Foundation survey in
2017 [24], only 36.0 % of respondents supported women’s
presence in the army or police force. Nevertheless, MoIA’s
Strategic Plan (MISP) aims to improve gender representa-
tion as well as ethnic balance within the services.
During the first years of police reform, bilateral and mul-
tilateral donors set up several training institutions both in
Kabul and in the provinces. There was, however, little
strategic thinking on how the ANP could develop a compre-
hensive training and education system. This has improved
in recent years. Currently, recruitment requirements are
mainly based on educational background. For example, to
become an officer the minimum requirement is a bachelor’s
degree from either the Police academy in Kabul or a foreign
police academy which is recognized by MoIA. To become
a non-commissioned officer (NCO) with the rank of 2nd
sergeant, the requirement is baccalaureate (12th grade cer-
tificate). To become an NCO with the rank of 3rd sergeant,
he or she must have completed 9th standard from school.
In contrast, there is no obligatory educational requirement
for being a patrolman/woman; although literate applicants
are preferred [25].
The challenges in building the capacity of the police
are not confined to police training and education. One of
the biggest challenges faced by MoIA and police, as well
as Afghanistan in general, is widespread corruption. Ac-
cording to Transparency International [26], Afghanistan is
ranked 177 out of 180 countries in the corruption index
perception. This is also seconded by a survey carried out
by Asia Foundation in 2017 [24] where 83.7% of Afghan
respondents mentioned corruption as a major problem. The
report also points out that ANP is the sixth largest institution
in Afghanistan receiving large sum of bribes. The issue is
pervasive, and requires a broad-based approach at both
grassroots and institutional levels.
4. Community-Oriented Policing in Afghanistan
4.1. The State as an Actor
Over the last decade, COP has become increasingly visible
in MoIA’s policing policies, albeit under a variety of names,
with the most common being Police-e Mardumi (PEM) [27].
The Ten-Year Vision of the Afghan National Police [28], for
example, was initiated by MoIA to reform and transform the
Afghan National Police from a ‘militarized’ unit in fighting ter-
rorism and counter-insurgency to a ‘service’ unit based on
human rights and the rule of law, and includes COP as one
of their priorities. COP is also a key component in MoIA’s
Five-Year Strategy [29]. In 2016, MoIA developed an ex-
plicit Police-e Mardumi (PEM) Policy, which firmly grounds
COP in Afghan law and its constitution, stating ‘...the pol-
icy has been designed and prepared in consideration of
Article (56) Paragraph (3) Article (75) and Article (134) of
the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan constitution, Article 5
of the Police Law, National Working Plan for UNSCR 1325,
and the Afghan National Police Strategy Plan’ (MoIA 2016).
The PEM policy’s two-year strategic plan (2016-17) points
specifically to the necessity of supporting and strengthen-
ing relations between public and national police in order to
reach the ANPs strategic goals [30].
Interest in COP began already in 2009, when the idea
for a democratic policing pilot project was introduced to
MoIA by EUPOL and later by UNOPS. This initiated a pro-
cess whereby the philosophy was introduced to both the
ministry and civil society actors, and activities were initiated
within MoIA to move the Afghan National Police towards
a more democratic and accountable policing service. The
purpose of these activities was to strengthen the relation-
ship between the local population and the police, and to
make police more responsive to the communities. The area
of focus was a combination of activities initiated by both the
police and by civil society, mainly with the support of the
international community, which included: family response
units, links between police and health care personnel, ac-
tivities with youth in the Scouts, an outreach project for
women and children, community consultations through es-
tablishment of new Shuras and action plans, mobile po-
lice teams to register complaints from citizens, and mobile
phone literacy programs for female police officers. There
were also community engagement programs like sports
events between the police and community, creating aware-
ness among school students on firefighting measures and
training on basic traffic rules (see next section).
The Police-e Mardumi program also contributed to a
change in the terminology used by the police. In our in-
terviews we noted the use of terms like ‘the cooperation
between the people and the police’, and how problems have
to be solved with close ‘cooperation and coordination’ of the
people (a recurring theme). MoIA and civil society actors be-
gan to publicly express the importance of COP by referring
to it as a ‘style of policing’, or ‘bridge between the commu-
nity and the public’ in which ‘people are the best source
of information’ [30]. In a 2016 conference to establish the
Board of the Implementation and Monitoring of Community
Policing Programs [31], the Director of PEM mentioned a
long list of activities and aspirations as the aims of Commu-
nity Policing, as demonstrated in his speech:
“The aim of COP is gaining cooperation of the com-
munity in terms of ensuring security, resolving conflict and
enforcing rule of law in consultation with the public and
through best practices of good policing. Furthermore, re-
moving the gap between police and community and creating
the spirit of cooperation and collaboration between the pub-
lic and the Afghanistan National Security Forces, especially
with the Police is of utmost importance. And also Preven-
tion of crimes through cooperation of public instead of only
pursuing criminal or crimes is an important aim of COP.”
PEM, however, did not develop in isolation. There were
several other MoIA processes prior to and during the devel-
opment of PEM that contributed to its growth and current
position in MoIA. Some of these focused on structural, orga-
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nizational and political issues within the Ministry itself, while
others focused on the provincial, district and community
levels.
4.1.1. MoIA-Focused Initiatives
One of the earliest activities focusing on improving relations
between the police and communities was the Minister of
Interior’s establishment of the 119 Information Center in
Kabul city. This center, established in 2009 with financial
support from NATO, currently has 58 employees (includ-
ing seven women) working 24 hours a day, seven days a
week and receives around 900 calls per day. Originally
established to give citizens an opportunity to report com-
plaints of police misbehavior, corruption, and human rights
violations, the helpline expanded to include the reporting
of criminal and terrorist activity as concern for crime and
violence increased.
As a respondent from the ministry pointed out, most
of the calls they receive pertain to violence, abuse and
harassment against women. The helpline also has three
other aims:
1) Corruption prevention and to receive feedback about
conduct of police against citizens.
2) Criminal cases, if there is a crime such as murder
or abduction to provide free legal services, and to provide
emergency ambulance services.
3) To provide help to the police themselves. Police, and
particularly female police, can call to complain and report
harassment. Also, if police are in a siege, they can call 119
for backup.
The call center, however, faces significant challenges,
including lack of adequate technical maintenance and sup-
port, low levels of training and knowledge transfer, and an
overwhelming number of false calls coming in. Because the
people who receive calls are not professional police, they
face difficulties in registering and routing incidents, causing
delay in appropriate and timely action by the police. In the
provinces where staffing is more limited and routines are
still new, there is a risk that a caller can connect to the
police staff about which the caller is complaining.
Despite these challenges, 119 for MoIA has proven to
be a useful channel for the police to get information from
the public about police performance and service provided
to the people. An important rationale behind this line is to
facilitate trust between citizens and the police services. The
helpline was extended from Kabul to five major provinces
(Kandahar, Helmand, Nangarhar, Herat, and Balkh) in 2013,
but according to MoIA officials, they lack sufficient funding
for this expansion to be successful.
Another area where MoIA made early inroads in terms
of community relations is their work on the protection of
women and children. Already in 2005, MoIA established
Family Response Units (FRUs), which deal with domestic
violence and female and child victims of crime. The aim of
the FRUs was ‘to address a wide array of criminal and civil
family-related matters including: divorce requests, promis-
sory notes, arranged/forced marriages, runaways, sexual
assaults, domestic violence, self-immolation, attempted sui-
cides, suicides, forced virginity tests, property disputes in-
volving widows and estates, child custody issues, abandon-
ment, financial and family support issues’ [32].
One of the most serious problems facing women in
Afghanistan is gender-based violence [33]. For various
reasons, women may be hesitant to report these types of
crimes to the police. For example, there could be cultural
norms inhibiting women and men to interact, a taboo of
speaking out or reporting sexual or domestic violence in
public, or fear, shame and embarrassment of involving the
police and judicial system in intimate private family matters
[34]. In this regard, one of the biggest challenges facing
Afghan society is gender segregation which inhibits women
and girls from reporting gender-based crimes to police -
especially to male police officers. Therefore, the establish-
ment of special units such as the FRUs in police stations
that cater to women’s needs, combined with the recruitment
of female police officers that can investigate such incidents
are of utmost importance. According to one of our police
respondents in Nimruz, these units have a broad mandate.
Cases where harsh or serious violence has been commit-
ted against women are usually registered by the police
and sent to the Criminal Investigation Department (CID)
(under which FRUs are organized). When the problem in-
volves quarrels or simple disputes between couples, elders
of both families are summoned to the police station, and,
through dialogue, counselling and guarantees from families
of the couple involved in the dispute, the case is solved.
In the case of recurring disputes, stronger measures are
taken. Some of these families are sent to the Directorate
of Women’s Affairs (DoWA) for help from counsellors and
attorneys. The connection between Police/FRU and DoWA
is a two-way relationship. Some of the cases are sent to
police for follow-through by DoWA and some of the cases
are sent to DoWA by police for further consultation and
follow-up. In other words, FRUs solve disputes through
dialogue and mediation between the involved parties in the
dispute and making them agree to a solution [35].
In Nimruz province, the FRU handled about 58 cases
within a period of ten months, of which 28 cases had been
referred to the penal authorities for further investigation,
while 30 cases were solved through the family consulta-
tion unit in the DoWA [36]. UNAMA/OHCHR [36] confirms
this when they mention that “police in provinces where
Family Response Units (FRUs) have been established and
whose members are mainly female, generally receive more
complaints and are more likely to act upon them’ (p.18).
Furthermore, the report found that ‘in the absence of Family
Response Units or visible women police officers, women
victims almost never approach police stations willingly, fear-
ing they will be arrested, their reputations stained or worse”
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[37]. These FRUs, through their close work with community
members, represent an important point of departure for the
evolving work on COP.
Another important measure undertaken by MoIA early
on which has contributed to the development of a strong
gender focus in COP is the establishment of the General
Directorate of Human Rights, Child Rights and Gender in
2009. The Directorate focuses on gender issues both within
the civilian population and the ANP. Issues like harassment
and violence against women and children, gender equality
within the police services, helpline for women, improving
the rank of women police officers, providing safe transport
for women police officers and child care facilities for women
who are prevented from going to work are some of the key
initiatives of the department. Recruitment, training, treat-
ment and retention of women police officers within ANP are
also important tasks for this office.
The Directorate also facilitates the Police Women’s
Council (PWC) (established in 2014) with support from
UNDP/LOTFA, UNAMA, EUPOL and ISAF. The purpose of
the council is to improve welfare and build capacity among
female police officers. The head of the directorate explained
that the priorities and objectives of the council were to help
in recruitment, training and retention of policewomen, in
training to eliminate violence against women police, in build-
ing good working environments in police stations and in
working against harassment of women police officers. The
head of the PWC in Nimruz reiterated some of these points
when interviewed, and mentioned specific problematic ar-
eas that she was trying to focus on such as lack of trans-
port facilities, lack of changing rooms, poor working condi-
tions for women, harassment from male colleagues, lack of
kindergartens, late promotions and overall lack of security
for women police officers. In her capacity as council head,
she has established four shura in four different departments
in the police to promote women’s interests. Since the in-
clusion of women is an important area of community-police
engagement, the strengthening of the capacity of women
police in different aspects e.g., improving accountability,
responsiveness, public trust and police behavior could, in
turn, facilitate more access to justice for women and other
vulnerable groups in communities.
The establishment of units like FRUs and PWCs are
important steps taken by MoIA in establishing communica-
tion and trust among vulnerable groups like women. The
road, however, has not been easy for the women developing
these initiatives, even with international support. Women
police officers have been harassed, threatened and killed in
their efforts to protect women’s rights. But these initiatives
are expanding and have received increasing support from
within MoIA, including the PEM Directorate.
4.1.2. International Initiatives for COP
As mentioned above, starting in 2008/9, several COP pilot
projects were initiated with the assistance of the interna-
tional community. Bernard et al. [38] distinguishes between
three types of COP pilot models. The first model was the
Neighborhood Watch Committees (NWCs), established in
2008, funded by GIZ and implemented by a local NGO
in four provinces. This was a bottom-up program, where
community representatives and the police met to discuss
local issues and find solutions within the shura structure.
Although the police participated, it was not facilitated by the
police, and the impact on police image and perceptions was
limited to those who participated. Although it is difficult to
know how many of these NWCs are still functioning, one
NGO leader informed that only a few of them are still at
work. Despite the international stakeholders being sensitive
to the importance of local institutions such as the shura,
creating new shura based on the needs of specific projects
did not guarantee their survival after the project. Instead,
another strategy could be to find ways to build on existing
shura, something we discuss in more detail in the next sec-
tion on police-community relations in our case study area
of Nimruz.
The second pilot was the Afghan Democratic Policing
Project (ADPP), established in 2012, and funded by the
Dutch Embassy through UNAMA and UNOPS. This was a
set of diverse projects run by eight civil society actors in 12
provinces. This was also a bottom-up program implemented
by civil society organizations, but it was implemented with
MoIA’s coordination. There was a broad range of activities,
including school safety and scout programs, collaboration
between the police and hospitals to protect rape victims,
sports activities, and community consultations and action
plans. The focus was on building peoples’ trust in the police
in the course of everyday life. While these projects tackled
specific issues, they simultaneously provided an opportu-
nity for creative approaches to improve police-community
relations for a large number of police. While this project offi-
cially ended in 2015, many of the activities have continued
as a part of the current PEM.
The third pilot was the PEM project mentioned above.
This was also established in 2012, funded by EUPOL, and
implemented by MoIA together with a civil society organi-
zation. It was implemented in seven provinces, but not the
same provinces or districts as the ADPP pilots. Many of the
activities were similar to those in the ADPP, but addition-
ally focused on building the capacity of the police in COP
principles at a district level (or police station level in Kabul),
and later at a strategic level through mentoring in MoIA [39].
Training and education in COP approaches was also an im-
portant aspect of this program. The strength of this project
is that it played an important role in institutionalizing PEM
after years of struggle to get a foothold in MoIA. When the
concept of COP had been introduced by EUPOL and the
ICPB in 2009, and activities such as the 119 Helpline were
developed, the political climate in MoIA towards reform was
tense. In interviews with international police experts, they
expressed that it was difficult for the international commu-
nity to support change, when those wanting change were
not in power - some thought it impossible. Rather than
give up, both the ADPP and EUPOL shifted their focus to
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districts and communities, where politics were less limiting.
This allowed for the accumulation of experience and evi-
dence of successful COP activities which could, in turn, be
used to convince the skeptics in MoIA of the value of COP
in building trust in the police. Thus, when politics shifted, it
was possible to get a foot in the door and establish a unit,
which is now a directorate of PEM.
Both the ADPP and the EUPOL mission concluded at
the end of 2016. PEM, however, continues. Although it still
receives some support from the international community
(UNDP/LOTFA for example), PEM has its own policy, action
plan and permanent staff, and is continually expanding its
activities into new provinces and districts, including Nim-
ruz, the site of our fieldwork. Despite its efforts to build
capacity and take the initiative to interact with communities,
PEM still struggles with people’s negative perceptions of
the ANP - trust is still in deficit. Several studies [40–45] tell
a tale of corruption, drug abuse, illiteracy, incompetency,
sexual abuse and violations of human rights by the police.
A baseline study conducted by Afghanistan Civil Society
Forum- organization (ACSF-o) [46] in 2010 for UNDP/MoIA
on democratic policing points to some interesting perspec-
tives on police-community relations covering eight northern
districts of Kabul. The majority of respondents from focus
group discussions felt that there would be very little co-
operation between the community and police without the
establishment of mutual trust. A big stumbling block for
cooperation and trust between the public and police was
corruption.
According to respondent; “they believe that as long as
corruption continues, they cannot expect their local police
to carry out their duties effectively or establish good rela-
tions with the general public” (p.19). In other words, lack
of police accountability is a serious alienating factor and
hence there is a continuous need for strengthening public
trust towards the police. This is no less important for PEM,
which emphasizes police accountability in both its policy
and activities.
4.1.3. International Influence and Local Ownership
As with any new endeavor, PEM has received both support
and criticism from both national and international sources.
One line of criticism points to a lack of real commitment to
the principles of COP, claiming that COP remains at policy
and speech levels, and that very little percolates down to
the operational level. They also suggest that government
representatives are more concerned with establishing their
authority through service delivery rather than exploring the
expressed needs of the people, and that the local police
were more concerned with establishing their own power
base with local elites than engaging with vulnerable com-
munities and protecting them from violence. These claims
were explained by some to be partly the result of a lack of
ownership of COP. They felt most of the policy measures
and changes proposed for the ANP were being forced on
them by the international community and as such were not
the initiative of MoIA. While the international community has
clearly had an important and even dominant role in sup-
porting police reform processes in earlier years, evidence
suggests that this may no longer be the case. The lead-
ership of PEM insists that PEM is now firmly grounded in
MoIA. This was clearly expressed by the head of PEM in a
recent interview, who said that ‘we should stop calling PEM
a project, it is a process’. PEM is now institutionalized in
MoIA, and is moving quickly to increase its civilian staff and
become more oriented towards law and order issues. An im-
portant step in this direction was to appoint a minister with
a managerial (rather than a military) background. Another
step was MoIA’s newly developed strategic plan MISP to
help coordinate efforts with other counter-corruption entities.
These efforts have facilitated the Major Crimes Task Force
(MCTF) to open more than 17 corruption cases in the first
quarter of 2018’ [47]. In total about 140 MoIA officials have
been referred to the prosecution authorities over corruption
charges. These developments indicate that PEM and COP
have a strong foothold in MoIA, and work in tandem with
broader efforts towards police accountability. With regard
to local ownership and the balance of ownership between
PeM and the public, this greatly depends on the context. In
one of the Shura-e Police (police-public consultation shura)
meetings in Nimruz’s capital city, the level of people’s par-
ticipation in discussions and the number of issues they took
up was overwhelming. The majority of discussions focused
on how to tackle high crime levels. This environment of
involvement and ownership was facilitated by PeM’s open-
ness to the people’s ideas and their participation at the
meeting, and is an example of a reform process that both
acknowledges and includes a variety of societal actors in
decision-making processes [11].
A second and related line of criticism points to a lack of
capacity and genuine interest by the police in discovering
and addressing the actual insecurities of local communities.
This refers to claims that PEM is not able to engage with
communities in ways that the international community envi-
sioned, particularly in terms of democratic representation in
consultative meetings. One of the NGO leaders implement-
ing the community-police consultation sessions explained,
for example, that despite the fact that in some provinces
women took more prominent roles in the consultative coun-
cils which were established to be the people’s focal point
with the police, in most of the provinces and districts women
were not present or only had a symbolic role. Also, the for-
mation of the shura has been criticized for the inclusion
of local power brokers and religious actors, and thereby
reinforcing parochial hierarchies. Thus, even though most
of the activities within the above projects were designed by
international stakeholders together with their local partners,
actual implementation of the projects has been somewhat
different, as it is influenced by local customs and power
relations. This illustrates a dilemma between local owner-
ship and international influence, one which is well known
in systems of development aid and institutional reform. Is
evidence of exclusion or lack of participation a sign of a lack
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of adherence to international democratic standards and of
‘failure’? Or can adjustments to local contexts be a sign
of increased local ownership and ‘success’, despite their
democratic shortcomings? Key to addressing this dilemma
is ensuring an inclusive process where voices from different
ethnic groups, gender, classes and religious backgrounds
can be heard on how they feel the police and communi-
ties might address their insecurities. In this sense, PEM
would do well to learn more from the ADPP concerning
the potential of civil society to mediate at least the initial
phases of police-community interaction [48]. Working with
organizations that have proven competence in engaging
with communities could ensure that both local sensitivities
are respected, and that power relations are nevertheless
challenged.
5. Local Institutions and Community-Police Relations:
the Case of Nimruz
The experiences from the pilots show that there are a wide
variety of ways in which police and communities might inter-
act to improve trust and address human security issues. In
our field research, we are exploring in greater depth which
local institutions already exist that could potentially link with
police to address local security issues. In doing this, we
consider the ways in which these institutions might both
be sources of legitimacy and keepers of unequal power
relations and entitlements in households and communities,
while also noting their ability and willingness to adjust these
aspects in light of new relations with the government.
5.1. Local Institutions
Before looking into local institutions and community policing
at the sub-national level, it is important to define what we
mean by “local institutions”. While local institutions can
refer to a variety of entities and practices such as tribal and
sub-tribal gatherings, inter-tribal assemblies, locality-based
ad hoc meetings, business-related bodies and sports feder-
ations, in this paper we primarily focus on the institutions of
shura and chowkidari. Shura is an Islamic term that refers
to the rule of opinion of the majority; the word comes from
the Holy Quran and is reflected in Shari’a law [49] where
it means “a serious and effective participation in making a
decision” [49].Shura can act as both local decision-making
councils as well as conflict resolution institutions ‘resolving
disputes and making collective decisions’[46]. Sometimes
the terms shura and jirga are used interchangeably. The in-
stitution of jirga originates from the Pashtun speaking tribal
people who mainly use it for making collective decisions
or resolving disputes that matter for the whole community
[50,51]. In the context of Afghanistan, the definitions and
descriptions of local institutions such as the shura and jirga
are not clear, and often contested - for example, the terms
are often used interchangeably, despite important differ-
ences in their workings. In Afghanistan, a jirga has stronger
decision making and implementation abilities [52], and de-
cisions made by a jirga [53] are considered more binding
than decisions made by shura. According to a study by Asia
Foundation [54], a jirga may use tribal forces to enforce its
decision. On the other hand, based on the same study,
shura refers to a group of leaders that make decisions on
behalf of the people they represent, and are thus looser,
advisory entities. Both shura and jirga can be held or estab-
lished at different levels. They could be held at the national
level to discuss and determine fundamental questions about
the state or they could be held at the household or com-
munity level to settle disagreements, quarrels and disputes.
Some writers distinguish between the two, where; ‘a jirga
usually meets to discuss a specific issue’, ‘a shura is usu-
ally a permanent or quasi-permanent council’ [55]. Despite
these differences, shura and jirga are both considered tradi-
tional institutions for inclusion, ownership, decision making
and community involvement at national, subnational and
community level in Afghanistan. Also, both shura and jirga
are generally male-dominated and comprised of elders and
clergy that have power and control over decision-making
processes.
In Afghanistan, the idea of shura has been used by the
Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development (MRRD)
in its National Solidarity Program (NSP) to utilize the culture
of “assembly” in its work at community level. In this scheme,
local populations have been mobilized into Community De-
velopment Councils (CDCs) or District Development Coun-
cils (DDCs) that collectively make decisions about grants
and the implementation of development projects at local
levels. These are often referred to as NSP Shura, to evoke
a sense of common interest identity, even though they may
be comprised of different members than existing shura in
the community. NSP has, for example, established women’s
shura, and in some areas shura with both men and women
members.
5.2. Nimruz Province
Nimruz province is one of the most remote provinces of
Afghanistan. It is located at the far southwestern part of
the country, bordering Iran, Pakistan, Helmand and Farah
provinces. Most of the people living in this province have
migrated from neighboring provinces at different periods in
time. According to government statistics, Nimruz province
has a settled population of 82,021 [56]. Even though there
is no accurate or official study of ethnic distribution in each
province, Nimruz is believed to have been originally popu-
lated by Baloch and Farsi-speaking Shia. Other ethnicities
like Pashtuns, Tajiks, Arabs, Uzbek and Hazaras also mi-
grated to Nimruz in different historical periods. Currently
Baloch and Pashtuns are considered the largest tribes living
in Nimruz. This population is distributed within six adminis-
trative provincial districts: Delaram, Khashrod, Chakhansor,
Kang, Charborjak and Zaranj. Zaranj City, the provincial
capital located on the border with Iran, is an interesting mix
of different tribes living together. Due to its proximity to the
Iranian border, there is a flourishing trade of illegal and legal
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goods with Iran.
Unlike other parts of Afghanistan, the majority of Nim-
ruz’s provincial districts have escaped serious threats of
insurgencies, terrorism and other serious conflicts that
have plagued the rest of the country (with the exception
of Khashrod and Delaram, which have seen sporadic in-
surgent activities). However, people we interviewed cited
other factors of insecurity that they experienced, includ-
ing: crimes related to human trafficking and drug business,
drugs harvested from Helmand and Farah provinces smug-
gled into Iran from Nimruz province, and drug addicts who
commit theft in order to finance their drug use. In addition,
respondents reported a number of other causes of insecu-
rity linked to livelihood security, like unemployment, poverty,
corruption, migration, lack of adequate water resources and
cultivable land. Many of these factors are interlinked, and
can in practice mutually reinforce each other.
The Afghan Uniform Police (AUP) is the main police unit
assigned to uphold the rule-of-law in cities, districts and
villages of the country. The AUP in Nimruz is headed by
the provincial chief of police, who manages general police
activity in the province. While other police units such as
The Afghan Public Protection Force (APPF), Police Special
Force (PSF) and Border Control Police (BCP) are present,
all of them operate under or in coordination with the AUP
(although the relationship between the different police units
can be unclear, even to police authorities).
A retired police officer in Nimruz told us that confusion
within the police structure starts from the top of the chain
of command in MoIA, given that every new minister brings
structural and strategic changes. For example, the system
of zonal police command units established by an earlier min-
ister along military lines was dissolved and the provincial
structure strengthened by the current minister. The border
police were initially tasked with safeguarding borders and
handling border crossing traffic and documentation, but a
presidential decree in 2018 saw the majority of these duties
handed over to the army. While the minister is the head
of the MOI, the deputies working under him exert varying
degrees of authority in overseeing the daily routine of their
sections. For example, the Deputy Minister for Security,
who is in charge of all police units, exerts a great degree
of power in spite of working under the minister. In Nim-
ruz province, this has created disagreement between the
chief of the police and his deputy for security (Deputy Chief
of Police for Security); while the chief of police considers
himself the representative of the minister and the overall
commander, his deputy for security considers himself the
representative of the Deputy Minister for Security, and there-
fore expects the chief of police to consult him before making
any changes to leadership and/or management of the units
under his purview. Interestingly, a young former police offi-
cer told us that this “mess” results from the transition from a
“communist” to an “American” police force; nobody knows
is who is who, or why there are so many similar units in the
police.
Nonetheless, it is still possible to describe how the chain
of the command functions at the provincial level in Nim-
ruz. The chief of the police is the overall head of the police
in the province, and responsible for both operations and
administration. Some units are directly under the chief of
police office such as the Directorate of Human Rights, Child
Rights and Gender and PEM, while other units are led by
his deputies. This includes his deputy for security, who over-
sees security in cities, districts and villages. The next unit of
command consists of the Police Districts (PDs), which are
stationed in both city and provincial districts, each having
an estimated 40 to 50 police personnel. Zaranj, the capital
city of Nimruz province, has four PDs, with one in each of its
provincial districts. Finally, the PDs have their own smaller
units called Samt, which consist of larger, more permanent
neighborhood-based check points, and are in charge of
setting up temporary check points.
5.3. The Shura and COP
Prior to the fall of 2016, Community Policing or Police- e-
Mardumi did not exist formally as an institution in Nimruz.
However, during our fieldwork in 2016 at the Police HQ, the
Directorate of Human Rights, Child Rights and Gender re-
ceived a copy of MoIA’s new strategy on PEM. This 15-page
policy was sent from the office of Deputy Minister of Senior
Security Affairs, MoIA, informing the province that the pur-
pose of PEM was to strengthen the relations between the
public and police. This included dealing with issues such
as people’s expectations of the police, police expectation
of people, expansion and support of women in the police,
Helpline119, holding meetings with people, public safety,
cooperation with schools and scouts, and publication and
communication. In our 2017 fieldwork we found that Police-
e Mardumi Unit had been established in the province in
late 2016 and had already facilitated the establishment of
Shura-e police (people-police consultation shura) in several
city districts as well as provincial districts like Kang. The
shura is held at the police office and locals and police are
part of it. the members of the shuras are elected by the
people in the first meeting.
Community respondents explained that strategies for
coping with many of the above-mentioned insecurities and
conflicts involve local institutions like the shura and the
chowkidari (watchman) system. These institutions have
been dealing with these challenges long before COP was
introduced as a formal policing model in 2016. Our data
confirms that the shura is an important informal institution
that deals with a broad range of issues like land disputes,
family issues, safety and security faced by communities.
Shura are also an important voice of the community, as
they represent them in relation to government, provincial
officials and police institutions. Our research also shows
that police and communities have had close contact, com-
munication and participation through these local institutions
for some time. For example, a People’s Shura in a neighbor-
hood of Zaranj City was recently established, representing
6000 households. The leadership explained that they had
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contacted the governor and police office to inform them
about their decision to establish the shura. He explained
that the police and the governor’s office had welcomed their
initiative, and the police have promised to help them in their
security needs. One of the initiatives of this newborn shura
was requesting villagers to install light bulbs on every fourth
house for security purposes. An interesting point in this
case is that this shura sprung out from an existing NSP
Community Development Council (CDCs), and thus had ex-
perience with working with the government on development
initiatives.
The People’s Shura of Khaja Karim, located in the north-
eastern part of the city, is another example of how com-
munities in partnership with police can curb crimes and
insurgencies. The head of the Crime Investigation Depart-
ment (CID) specifically mentioned the name of this shura
in his interview. He explained that the idea of the creation
of this shura had come out of a community consultation,
where he had suggested to the community elders to estab-
lish it as a venue for the police and community to come
together and consult on neighborhood security issues. The
head of the shura told us there were in fact two reasons
for the establishment of this particular shura: security and
development. The shura is based on three of the seven
Community Development Councils (CDCs) in Khaja Karim
area, and comprises an elected a chairman, deputy and
secretary, as well as a board of leadership consisting of
seven elders. In addition, there is consultation committee
that holds meetings once a week. Following their election,
the shura members had gone to the Provincial Council (PC)
where the police were also present. At the Provincial Coun-
cil, the shura members announced the establishment of the
shura and asked the police and PC to help them in their
endeavor to bring back security to the area.
According to our respondent, before the establishment
of this shura, the area was very unsafe and during the night
even the police patrol had difficulty entering the neighbor-
hood. Theft was common and people could not go out
because they were afraid of armed thieves and gangs. But
after the establishment of the shura and through better co-
operation with the police, security has vastly improved. The
shura members even had cell phone access to the police
so that they could call upon them in case of emergency. In
addition, shura members had to be contacted beforehand if
the police planned to conduct a house search or make an
arrest.
The second reason for the establishment of the shura
was developmental. The community believed if they created
a shura, they could attract more aid from NGOs and MRRD.
One of their developmental concerns was the lack of basic
infrastructure like bridges, paved roads, power and schools
(there is, for example, only one elementary school in the
area). According to one of the shura members, most of
the development projects are grabbed by wealthy people of
the villages who have more political and social power. For
example, one village and has electricity, water, school and
a clinic because it is comprised of people originating from
the area who know everyone at the decision-making level in
the province. The hope was that by uniting in a new shura,
they would be able to counter this type of favoritism and get
access to resources for their villages as well.
The shura also deal with conflict resolution between and
within families. For example, if there is a conflict regarding
land division or grabbing, the parties in conflict can ask the
shura to look into the problem and make a decision. More
intimate problems like domestic violence and divorce are
solved within the family through the help of a shura mem-
ber who is close to the family. When the problem is more
serious or criminal, the shura refers it to legal and penal
authorities. While there is always a degree of respect for
the decisions of the shura, at least in the case of Nimruz it
can be objected or rejected: one or all the parties involved
can ask for a different decision or ask for a change in the
members of the shura. In case the decision does not satisfy
one or all the parties involved, it would be referred to a
different shura or to the government authorities.
The shura also help people with bureaucratic problems
they may face. For example, if someone from the locality
has issues with government offices that go unaddressed,
shura members try to solve the problem through connec-
tions with police HQ, the governor and/or the PC. Another
issue is of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) who face the
problem of indiscriminate arrests: The head of one shura
mentioned a case where the police had arrested a person
on charges of being a Taliban member. After the shura
member’s intervention and talks with police where he ex-
plained that this person was known to the community and
is not a Taliban member, the arrested person was released.
This shura has also established and manages a volun-
tary night watch group that operates from 4pm to 9am. The
individuals in this group are unarmed and relatively young;
in the shura’s opinion, carrying arms would provoke the
perpetrators more into causing harm. However, the night
watch group does have access to the police’s cell number
in case of emergency, and police responsiveness to their
emergency calls is good. According to shura members, this
trust in the police is based on the readiness of the police
to act upon being called and their capacity to follow-up on
cases.
Respondents from a border village also voiced similar
views when asked about their relations with the police. This
village (being near to the Iranian border) had close contact
with the Border Police Base. The head of the shura of this
village mentioned that he would have regular meetings with
the commander of the base whenever there was an incident
or when aid came to the village so that the police could help
distribute it in an orderly manner. He also mentioned that
for issues of security and safety he would contact this police
base.
While the Khaja Karim People Shura is a neighborhood
shura and concentrated in one part of the city, the Grand
People’s Shura represents the majority of tribes in the city.
This 15-man shura was established in response to the
chaotic atmosphere created after the controversial pres-
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idential election in 2014. It has proven to be powerful and
credible enough to address a variety of societal and gov-
ernmental issues and even summon high ranking police
officers and government staff. The credibility of the shura
comes from support of influential clergy and tribal elders.
Even though these shura are based on communal
decision-making and the election of members, they retain
the old tradition of keeping women out of the shura. Women
may not be members of the shura, but their cases and cases
which involve them are represented in the shura through
their male Mahram (close relatives or unmarriageable kin).
This can be problematic if a women’s male family members
or relatives are not supportive of her case or are in fact
perpetrators. It was unclear during these initial interviews
the extent to which this type of representation has affected
women’s position in Nimruz, and warrants further inves-
tigation, including an exploration in the degree to which
government institutions such as the police might fill such a
gap for women.
Citizen initiatives for safeguarding neighborhoods and
business establishments are done through a kind of ‘infor-
mal policing’ called chowkidari (watchman). A chowkidari
system is an old tradition in Afghanistan, Pakistan and In-
dia. We learned of the chowkidari system in Nimruz from a
watchman of the Shura-e Mardumi (Grand People’s Shura).
He explained how the system of chowkidari provides se-
curity to shopkeepers and business establishments. They
cover more than 2000 shops and market places in Nimruz.
They patrol the streets and look after the shops and other
establishments during the night. They do so with four mo-
torbike patrols and 18 other staff who walk in the street of
the market. According to our respondent, the number of
thefts and crimes against business places has drastically
decreased. However, they do not cover households - this
is purely a private initiative taken by business people. The
charge for their services is 120 Afghani per month (approx-
imately USD 1.50). The chowkidar are not armed with
guns, but instead carry a wooden stick during their night pa-
trolling. The individual chowkidar are hired based on prior
relationships and acquaintance with the head chowkidar,
and they work in close cooperation with the local police dis-
trict. If there is an acute need they contact the commander
of the PDs. We were told that the relationship between the
chowkidar and police is friendly and cooperative. The shop-
keepers and business establishments and the chowkidar
hold monthly meetings, and the head chowkidar is equipped
with a cell and he can be reached by all if the need arises.
5.4. Nimruz within Afghanistan
Our findings from Nimruz draw attention to some little
understood aspects of community-police relationships in
Afghanistan. For example, our case shows how people’s
effort and initiatives towards their own security strength-
ens arguments for the viability of a human security per-
spective as well as a bottom-up approach. Those best
positioned to understand the complex interplay of security
issues, livelihood challenges and conflict resolution are the
community women and men themselves. As we mentioned
above, shura at the community and provincial level act as
a bridge between the community and the government. Be-
tween the government and the shura, the shura are the first
choice of the people. Perceived corruption of government
officials, unnecessary paper work, hassle, impotency and
commuting expenditure (at the community level) are some
of the major reasons why people prefer the shura over the
government as a conflict-solving organization. Addition-
ally, cultural issues are another major barrier between the
people and the government; at the community level it is
considered a shame and humiliation to go to government
to solve cases of conflict, especially if it is conflict over mar-
riage and divorce. People prefer to solve their problems
within the “four walls” of their homes rather going to gov-
ernment or involving a member of the shura who is known
to the family. Communities try to address the challenges
they face in securing their livelihoods, including conflicts,
themselves, before seeking outside assistance. We have
seen that shura are not only important institutions for con-
flict resolution, but also viable arenas for contact between
the community and police. Our case shows that commu-
nities in Nimruz have been having close communication
with the police concerning different aspects of their security
needs even before COP became an official policing ap-
proach. A good example of this is the inauguration meeting
of the Grand People’s shura in Zaranj city where the police
chief was present and promised support. Such initiatives
have been taken solely by the shura concerned without any
prompting from the government, NGO’s or international aid
agencies. These micro-level initiatives are important build-
ing blocks towards community-police relationships, strength-
ening the very ethos of community-oriented policing based
on community involvement, partnership and mutual trust.
6. Challenges and Opportunities for COP in
Afghanistan
6.1. An Evolving Shura
The presence of local institutions can offer both challenges
and opportunities in police reform processes where COP is
in focus. Since a COP approach involves the participation
of a variety of state and non-state actors, challenges and
opportunities can be perceived by these actors very differ-
ently. The way a shura interacts with the government can
thus vary, depending on the local context and the nature
of the authority of elites. As local institutions usually serve
to preserve and strengthen local power elites [41], this can
result in either support for or rejection of reform processes.
Our research in Nimruz has revealed several examples of
shura serving to improve relations with the police. How-
ever, we have also found evidence of local elites feeling
threatened by the creation and strengthening of relations
between the citizens and state institutions, which led them
to hamper rather than facilitate reform activities. It thus is a
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challenge for reforming efforts to recognize and find ways
to engage constructively with local power elites that might
perceive COP as a threat to their power base.
There are also challenges related to different ideas
around the composition of the shura. As noted above, the
composition of shura reflects power relations, and most of
the shura in Nimruz are dominated by elders and clergy who
reinforce traditional power relations in communities. These
relations have been challenged beyond the implementa-
tion of COP. As mentioned earlier, the National Solidarity
Program established several types of CDCs (also known
locally as Shura-e enkeshafi) in villages in an attempt to
promote broader participation from the community. These
CDCs built on the collective principle of shura to ensure
credibility in the community, but at the same time introduced
changes, such as the inclusion of women, either in a sep-
arate women’s shura or as members in a common shura.
While shura continue to have challenges and problems sur-
rounding inclusion and representation, they nevertheless
represent a change towards a more inclusive institution.
Shura are, as the rest of society, evolving and responding
to present needs and circumstance. As mentioned before,
women may not be part of the structure or even attend
shura meetings but if they are party to a conflict, they are
represented in shura through a trusted party such as fa-
ther, husband or brother (unless they do not support the
woman’s claim). A shura representative explained that it is
now becoming more common that women’s development
and security needs are kept in mind when negotiations take
place in the shura. For example, when one of the shura
members from Khaja Karim was discussing the need for
paved roads, he mentioned that when women and girls from
their neighborhood were commuting to schools or hospitals,
they faced difficulties because of the lack of paved roads
and accumulation of water in the streets. Traditional shura,
on the other hand, would have taken measures to prevent
girls from going to school or women to the hospital.
There are generational shifts in the composition of the
shura; young men are becoming more prominent in decision
making. While previously, youth would have implemented
shura decisions without question, they now influence deci-
sions made and can even lead a shura. In one of our study
villages, the shura is led by a young man who has a positive
relationship with the police as well as other government
agencies. In another instance, youth were in charge of plan-
ning meetings and operating the Night Watch, informing
others about shura meetings and keeping records of the
meetings and decisions made.
Minorities and other social groups are creating their own
shura. In this way, they can unite their efforts in solving
social problems and have a stronger voice in negotiating
with police and other government agencies. For example, a
shura representing the interest of specific migrants from an-
other province plays an important role in resolving conflicts
and renegotiating their status with government agencies.
The shura’s relationship with the police is also changing.
While previously shura were mostly engaged with District
Police and Criminal Investigation Department to follow up
particular cases, the opening of PEM Directorate in the
province has facilitated the police in general in Nimruz to
cooperate and work closely with a variety of shura.
6.2. An Afghan COP
Similar to the locally initiated collaborations between the
police and shura in Nimruz, PEM’s Shura-e Police (police-
public consultation shura) can be important arenas for
establishing locally sustainable partnerships to cooperate
and work together on community needs towards security
and development issues. The potential of PEM’s presence
should not be underestimated, as they can be a significant
influence toward changes in the shura over time. While
there is limited quantitative data on, for example, the effect
of the pilot projects and PEM on crime rates, qualitative
data reveals that both the police and communities are
convinced of the positive effect of these activities on human
security, trust-building and crime prevention. The pilot
projects introduced new ways to engage with community
members, and influenced the Shura-e Police on issues
of gender relations and the representation of youth and
minorities, as well as power relations of traditional elders
and clergy. Such avenues of cooperation can be beneficial
in establishing trust, ownership and sustainability in the
long run and help in creating space for change. As Peter
Albrecht has argued:
“Focusing on what works and incremental change is
important because wholesale transformation in the short
term is not feasible. Indeed, even if this were possible,
abrupt change would not be sensitive to the potential for
conflict in fragile situations. Working with and building on
already existing institutions therefore becomes essential”
[57].
Such a bottom-up approach opens new avenues to learn
more about insecurities experienced at the local level, and
helps to identify local strategies. These insecurities can
comprise livelihood challenges like poverty, unemployment,
education and health service. They can also include con-
flicts over access to and use of natural resources like land
and water, or issues like migration, divorce, sexual and
honor-based violence and gender relations. Understanding
the interdependence of these issues, including the complex-
ities of local power relations and institutions is vital if police
reform processes are to be operationalized and successful.
Without such knowledge, it will not be possible to under-
stand human security issues on the ground, or to know who
might address them in what ways. As Marenin [58] points
out, it is the understanding of ‘which insecurities bother
people the most, which aspects can be addressed most
easily, what practices are most feasible, which will have the
largest pay-off in the sequencing of reforms, or which leads
to a better sequence of reforms (p. 54). Such community-
based initiatives also help in building a good foundation for
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self-sustainability and ownership of processes of change.
Since international support is not meant to be indefinite, the
ability of a shura to survive should be sought in their natural
composition, specialization and the context they operate
within. Where this has been the case in Afghanistan, the
shura continue to exist beyond project periods and offering
modest services without any international funding.
These experiences can in turn feed into security policy
reforms that can bridge existing gaps between the police
and communities, and can help to better understand the
range of actors and interests operating at the local level to
find the right mix of security and development. As Albrecht
rightly reminds us: “Actors such as traditional leaders and
vigilante groups are considered the primary providers of
justice and security in most fragile environments, and deal
with an estimated 70 to 90 per cent of local disputes in
Africa and Asia” [57]. This is indeed the case in Nimruz,
and in Afghanistan in general, where the shura and other
local informal institutions remain the most important arenas
for conflict resolution in the community. The lesson here
is not that a shura or chowkidar will always be interested
or be in a position to work with the police and co-create
COP, since they exist in many different sub-national con-
texts with different constellations of power relations. We
can, however, through the presentation and analysis of the
case from Nimruz, underline the importance of having an in-
clusive process of engaging with local institutions in COP in
ways that recognize power relations, histories, divergent in-
terests in order to make change sustainable in the long-run.
In this way the Nimruz case offers insight into how to identify
and understand the context that is the key to developing
improved relations between the police and communities.
7. Conclusions
Post-conflict situations are complex, and addressing issues
of security and insecurity are challenging. This is indeed
the case for police reform in post-conflict Afghanistan. Po-
lice are often the first level of government people come in
contact with, and how people perceive them is crucial to
government legitimacy. In Afghanistan, police have been
viewed with fear, suspicion and mistrust, and corruption
levels are high. When the international community stepped
in to assist in police reform in 2001, there was little focus
on building trust between police and communities. While
the reform efforts of MoIA and central government to create
a trusted national law enforcement institution have been
important, they have been insufficient to guarantee safety
and security to all people, as they remained top-down and
politically motivated. This changed in 2009, when the in-
ternational community introduced COP as a way to build
trust and to address the complex issues of human security
in local communities. This also marked the entrance of con-
cepts like local ownership, trust-building and sustainability
to the Afghan police lexicon. The COP pilot projects, for
example, took a community focus, both on building trust,
and exploring how local issues can be addressed by the
police and communities together. Through these pilots,
COP became increasingly grounded in Afghan experiences,
and as political power shifted within the ministry leadership,
PEM has become institutionalized in MoIA. PEM contin-
ues to expand to new provinces and districts, where there
are certainly new experiences in police-community that are
emerging. We therefore argue that COP in Afghanistan was
not merely an imported concept—the way that COP was
implemented through linking with local institutions and civil
society actors went a long way in making COP a locally-
owned process addressing the diverse and complex needs
of Afghan women and men.
An important aspect we have uncovered in this research
is the varied ways in which the police interact with local
communities and their institutions. Our research on COP
implementation shows that the pilot projects introduced
with the assistance of the international community were
innovative in creating relations between the police and com-
munities, including local shura, with the added advantage of
supporting gender, youth and minority inclusion. Through
our case study of Nimruz, we explored in depth what these
local institutions are, and what efforts have been taken by
both the police and the community to build trust and address
a broad range of insecurities. We saw, for example, how
communities were innovative in the ways they addressed
issues of security, conflict and livelihood challenges, both
alone and together with the police. We also saw the local
police seek platforms and ways to govern with the help of
these local entities, and how these efforts were perceived
as less corrupt and bureaucratic, which led to acceptance
and credibility. In both examples, the relationships focused
on building trust and solving problems jointly rather than on
informing, reporting and surveillance. While the achieve-
ments of PEM are promising, they do not exist in a vacuum,
and will be influenced by wider political and economic cir-
cumstances that may limit their effectiveness. However,
gaining insight into local processes and institutions where
women and men tackle issues of insecurity in their everyday
lives is key in developing the trust needed for police reform
to be able to contribute to human security in the long run.
There are several policy implications inherent in the
findings from this study. First, international assistance to
police reform should explicitly require inclusive processes;
police reform with a clear focus on inclusive processes of
engagement with a diversity of local actors and institutions
increases the chance of local ownership and sustainability.
Second, inclusive COP requires capacity building of both
the police and civil society, not only in terms of skills training
in crime fighting and livelihood development, but also in the
skills of dialog and trust-building. Finally, COP cannot be
implemented by police alone—a clear policy of communica-
tion and collaboration with other government departments
and civil society organizations in a ‘whole of society’ ap-
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